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The Non-Evidential Nature of Perceptual Experience
Abstract
Most internalist views hold that experience provides evidential justication for per-
ceptual belief, although there are dierent ideas about how experience is able to
provide this justication. Evidentialism holds that experiences can act as evidence
for belief without having propositional content, while dogmatism holds that only an
experience with the content that p can provide prima facie justication for the belief
that p. I argue that both views succumb to a version of the well-known Sellarsian
dilemma: it's entirely unclear how an experience could act as evidence for belief
without having propositional content, and it is ad hoc to claim that experiences with
propositional content can act as evidence for belief without explaining why these
experiences need not be justied themselves. The way out of the dilemma lies in
accepting the non-evidential nature of perceptual experience.
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1 Introduction
Suppose that you want to know whether your neighbors are in. You look out the window and
see that all the lights are o and that there is no car in the driveway. Under these circumstances
it seems natural to say that perception has provided you with evidence for the belief that your
neighbors are not at home. It's not entirely clear what constitutes this evidence though. It might
consist of the fact that the car is not in the driveway and the fact that the lights are o. It might
also consist of your knowledge of these facts, or merely of your believing these things. Finally,
your perceptual experience itself might constitute a large part of the evidence for the belief that
your neighbors are not at home. Whatever the precise nature of the evidence, it seems plausible
that any good account of why you have a justied belief that the neighbors are not at home will
have to say something about the evidence you had. But it's also plausible that the case at hand
is not one about immediate, or non-inferential justication. Your belief seems to depend too
heavily on an inference that takes the car's not being in the driveway and the lights' being o as
premises for the conclusion that the neighbors are not at home. So let's look instead at a belief
that might follow more directly from your perceptual experience, viz. the belief that the lights
are o. Is it also plausible that this belief is evidentially justied?
Most internalists would answer this question armatively. On their account, what constitutes
the evidence for our most basic perceptual beliefs is perceptual experience itself. In contrast,
some externalists, most notably Jack Lyons (Lyons, 2009a), hold that experience does not provide
evidential justication for perceptual belief, and is instead only a contingent part of a reliable
cognitive process which results in perceptual belief. Justication arises because of the reliabil-
ity of the entire perceptual process, and not because experience constitutes sucient evidence.
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Although this idea is quite controversial, Lyons presents a large problem for internalists and
externalists who hold the contrary: they have to overcome a version of the well-known Sellarsian
dilemma (Lyons, 2008, 2009a). Either experience is non-propositional and therefore unable to
serve as evidence for belief, or it is propositional but in need of justication itself before it can
serve as evidence for belief.1
In this paper I expound on Lyons' argument by discussing two versions of internalism which
each grasp a dierent horn of the dilemma. Evidentialism, as proposed by Richard Feldman
and Earl Conee (1985), holds that experiences can act as evidence without having propositional
content, while dogmatism, as proposed by James Pryor (2000; 2004) and Michael Huemer (2001),
holds that a perceptual experience with the content that p provides immediate prima facie
justication for the belief that p.2 I argue that both theories succumb to the problems outlined
above. Evidentialism does not make clear how non-propositional states could serve as evidence
for belief, especially given their pivotal notion of `tting the evidence'. Dogmatism remains ad
hoc without an explanation of what it is about perceptual experience that enables it to provide
justication without being itself justied. Given these problems for the internalist views, Lyons'
controversial thesis, that perceptual experience is non-evidential in nature, starts to look more
and more plausible. In the nal section of this paper, I discuss two externalist views that can
accommodate this thesis, and end with a suggestion for their improvement.
2 Evidentialism
Feldman and Conee characterize their evidentialist position about justication with the help of
the following biconditional (Evidentialist Justication):
EJ Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justied for S at t if and only if
having D toward p ts the evidence S has at t (Feldman and Conee, 1985, p. 15).
The rst thing to notice about this characterization is that it is only about what is called
`propositional justication' : it tells us only which doxastic attitude is justied for a subject, and
not whether a subject is actually justied in the doxastic attitude he has. The latter notion
is called `doxastic justication'. A certain doxastic attitude might be propositionally justied
without being doxastically justied if the subject in question does not base the attitude on the
evidence that makes it propositionally justied. To give an example: if I have strong evidence
for the belief that p, but do not believe p on the basis of that evidence (I rather like the sound of
p and therefore believe it), then my belief that p is propositionally but not doxastically justied.
To accommodate the notion of doxastic justication, Feldman and Conee also present a
characterization of well-foundedness:
WF S's doxastic attitude D at t toward proposition p is well-founded if and only if
(i) having D toward p is justied for S at t; and
(ii) S has D toward p on the basis of some body of evidence e, such that
(a) S has e as evidence at t;
(b) having D toward p ts e; and
1I want to be neutral on what it exactly means to be a propositional state (a state with propositional content),
but I will assume that if a state is conceptual, then it is also propositional.
2Note that Huemer's theory is actually about immediate justication in general (not just about perceptual
justication) and is called ` phenomenal conservatism' in its full generality.
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(c) there is no more inclusive body of evidence e0 had by S at t such that having D
toward p does not t e0 (Feldman and Conee, 1985, p. 24).
This characterization includes that a subject actually has a certain doxastic attitude on the
basis of some body of evidence, and thus enables evidentialists to deal with the above distinction
between propositional and doxastic justication. There are still some questions left though.
First, what constitutes the body of evidence for a doxastic attitude, and, second, when does a
doxastic attitude t the evidence?
With regard to the rst question, Feldman and Conee answer that \it seems clear that this
[evidence] includes both beliefs and sensory states such as feeling very warm and having the visual
experience of seeing blue" (Feldman and Conee, 1985, p. 32, fn. 2). However, it seems equally
clear that not all beliefs should count as evidence. I cannot improve the epistemic status of my
belief by randomly adopting other beliefs that support it. One plausible explanation of this fact
is that the randomly adopted beliefs would not be justied, and therefore unable to confer any
justication onto the beliefs that can be inferred from them. So an important constraint on those
beliefs that can constitute evidence seems to be that these beliefs must themselves be justied,
i.e., supported by evidence. Although this looks like the start of a regress, note that this need
not be the case if sensory states can also constitute evidence. This would make sensory states
extremely important for Feldman and Conee's theory, as they would provide the foundation for
all other evidence.
However, sensory states also bring with them some dicult issues if they are to serve as
evidence. Feldman and Conee do not require that sensory states must have propositional content
to constitute evidence, as they do not really think that experiences take propositions as their
objects. According to them, such a view is one of several \somewhat contorted attempts to
make some other views match the view we prefer" (Conee and Feldman, 2004, p. 2). But if
sensory states do not have propositional content, then it is unclear how they, on their own, could
serve as evidence for specic propositions. Feldman and Conee are surprisingly silent about this
matter. What is it about a feeling of warmth that makes it evidence for the belief that I am
warm, instead of evidence for the belief that I am cold? If the state does not have propositional
content, then it certainly does not imply that I am warm instead of being cold. Nor does it seem
to make sense that the experience itself makes a certain belief probable.3 The proposition that
an experience with such-and-such properties occurs might stand in these relationships to belief,
but this proposition is dierent from the experience itself.
James Pryor (2005, p. 193) thinks that there might be another way to nd a connection
between non-propositional experience and belief that explains how the former could justify the
latter. This suggestion has to do with the \logical structure" of events and propositions, and the
idea is that the event of my having an experience, e.g., a headache, has a similar logical structure
as the proposition that I have a headache. This similarity in logical structure supposedly explains
why my having a headache justies my belief that I have a headache, instead of some other
proposition. Unfortunately, it seems that the event of my having a headache is again not the
same as the experience of the headache itself, so we would no longer retain Feldman and Conee's
idea that experiences themselves can act as evidence for belief. And that is exactly the thesis
that is currently under consideration. Moreover, Pryor's suggestion excludes the possibility that
I have a justied but false belief about my own experience, given that there will then be no event
relevantly similar in structure to the content of my belief.4
3See (Williamson, 2000, pp. 194-200) for this kind of argument in favor of the thought that all evidence is
propositional.
4Lyons (2009b) uses this argument against any theory of introspection which holds that introspective beliefs
are justied by experiential evidence.
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Laurence BonJour (2003) takes there to be a descriptive relation between a non-propositional
experience and a conceptual belief about that experience, where the character of the experience
determines whether the description is true. BonJour further claims that \an awareness of that
non-conceptual [and non-propositional, p. 70, fn. 6] character can seemingly constitute a kind of
reason for thinking that the description is true or correct [...] { thus apparently providing a basis
for the justication of the conceptual claim" (BonJour and Sosa, 2003, p. 72). Now if BonJour
means that we have a second-order awareness of our experience, i.e., a second-order belief that
we have an experience with such-and-such properties, then this just pushes the question about
evidence and propositionality one step further back. However, BonJour stresses that the aware-
ness should not be thought of as a higher-order awareness of the experience (BonJour and Sosa,
2003, pp. 63{4), but rather, as a \constitutive, or \built-in," non-apperceptive awareness of
[the experience's] distinctive sort of [sensory] content" (BonJour and Sosa, 2003, p. 70). But
then this suggestion seems to come down to little more than stating that being conscious of a
non-propositional content, in other words, undergoing a non-propositional experience, can serve
as evidence for belief | albeit a belief about the experience itself.
A nal internalist suggestion to overcome the problem of providing an evidential connection
between non-propositional experience to belief would have it that the feeling of warmth, together
with my knowledge of the reliable connection between this feeling and my being warm, is sucient
to constitute evidence of my actually being warm. However, such a move would only invite the
question where the knowledge of the reliable connection stems from. On what evidence is this
knowledge in turn based? We would now be back in the evidential regress that sensory states
were exactly meant to end.
One might therefore turn externalist instead, and hold that a feeling of warmth is evidence
for the belief that I am warm merely because it reliably indicates that I am, thereby no longer
presupposing that I have to know about this connection. This cannot explain how experience
provides doxastic justication though, or at least, it cannot on Feldman and Conee's denition of
it. At best this might provide a way to dene propositional justication: if a subject has access
to a reliable indicator that p, then he has propositional justication for the belief that p. But if
the subject does not know of the connection between the reliable indicator and what it indicates,
then he can hardly be said to hold his belief that p \on the basis of" (Feldman and Conee, 1985,
p. 24) this reliable indicator | after all, we supposed that the subject need not know of the
reliable connection between the indicator and p. Of course we could choose to use `basing' and
`evidence' in this externalist way, but this would then describe a justicatory process that is still
dierent from the way in which one might hold a belief that q on the basis of the belief that p
and the belief that if p, then q. So instead of providing an illuminating account of perceptual
justication, this way of putting matters would actually obscure important dierences between
the ways in which one can arrive at a justied belief.
So far we have only considered the question of how a single non-propositional state could
serve as evidence for a specic proposition. The situation only gets worse once one focuses on
the question of when a doxastic attitude ts a body of evidence. The idea is that a complete
body of evidence could favor or disfavor (or neither) a certain proposition. But then some sort
of logical interaction between dierent pieces of evidence seems to be necessary to determine
whether the complete body of evidence favors a proposition or not. Now suppose that there
are non-propositional sensory states among the complete body of evidence. Then it is entirely
unclear how these should be weighed in combination with, say, propositional beliefs. If I believe
that the store is open on Monday, but you tell me that the store is closed on Monday, then your
testimony contradicts my belief. My belief has the content that p, while your testimony has the
content that :p. But there would be no such contradiction in content between my feeling of
warmth and my belief that I am cold. If there is a dierent kind of tension between these two
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things, then it would be nice to have some sort of theory about it. And once one even allows
feelings of condence or certainty into the evidence mix (which is hinted at several times by
Conee and Feldman5), then there even is an extra non-propositional factor to make the weighing
process more dicult.
Again the externalist turn might seem to provide some help. Take the following suggestion
by Juan Comesa~na:
Necessarily, believing that p ts e for subject S if and only if:
1. e doesn't include any beliefs of S and the connection between S's having e and
p is actually reliable; or
2. e includes beliefs of S, all of these beliefs are justied, and the connection be-
tween S's having e and p is conditionally actually reliable (Comesa~na, 2010, p.
581).
Comesa~na gives a similar account of when disbelieving that p ts the evidence (just substitute :p
for p in the two clauses), and denes suspension of judgment as a tting attitude when neither
believing nor disbelieving ts the evidence.
The benet of this account of tness is that it need not consider any logical connections
between dierent pieces of evidence, but can instead focus on the connection between the subject's
having some collection of beliefs and sensory states, and the truth (or falsity) of the proposition
in question. Thus, the previous problem of evidence-weighing disappears. Yet this externalist
account of t also encounters similar worries as the earlier externalist suggestion. It's possible
that the evidence seems to indicate that p from the subject's perspective, even though having
the evidence is, in fact, actually reliably connected with :p. For instance, suppose that a subject
has an auditory experience of a reliable source telling him that p, but that having this specic
auditory experience is actually reliably connected to :p because (unbeknownst to the subject)
the specic tone of voice indicates that the source is lying. On Comesa~na's account, disbelieving
that p would now t the evidence. Hence, the subject would be justied in disbelieving p and
unjustied in believing p on the basis of his evidence. Yet surely, the subject in question would
be doing something irrational if he disbelieved p on the basis of his auditory experience, as he
has no idea of the connection between tone of voice and lying.
The problem of making clear how a non-propositional state could serve as evidence for a
specic proposition, and the problem of explaining how a certain doxastic attitude could t
an evidence set which consisted partly out of non-propositional states, appear to be decisive
problems for the evidentialist view as proposed by Feldman and Conee. Note that my claim is
not that non-propositional sensory states could never contribute to the justication of beliefs.
My claim is merely that it is entirely unclear how non-propositional states could evidentially
justify certain beliefs. This leaves open whether they contribute to the justication of beliefs
without serving as evidence for them by, for instance, reliably causing them.6 Indeed, in the last
section of this paper I present an externalist alternative that is fully compatible with this idea.
3 Dogmatism
So far we have considered evidentialism, which holds that perceptual experience can provide
evidential justication without having any propositional content. This theory thus grasps the rst
5See their collection of essays (2004), p. 70, 76, 112, 238-9.
6See (Lyons, 2009a, pp. 21{26) for more on the distinction between evidential and non-evidential justiers,
and evidential and non-evidential justication.
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horn of the Sellarsian dilemma, and is indeed faced with the dicult challenge of explaining how a
non-propositional state could provide any evidential justication. In contrast, dogmatism grasps
the second horn of the dilemma, and holds that perceptual experience does have propositional
content that is important for evidential justication. Its view can be summarized by the following
conditional (Dogmatist Justication):
DJ If S has a perceptual experience that p, then S has immediate prima facie justication for
the belief that p (Pryor, 2000, 2004; Huemer, 2001).
According to dogmatism, justication is immediate in the sense that a subject can have
justication for the belief that p without being in need of any evidence or justication to believe
some other proposition. The thought is that you do not need to be justied in believing that
you are not a brain in a vat to have justication for the belief that you have two hands. All you
need for the latter is to have a perceptual experience that you have two hands.
Second, dogmatism holds that the justication arising out of experience is prima facie: ex-
periential justication can be defeated by additional evidence. For instance, if I know that the
two lines in the Muller-Lyer illusion only appear to be of a dierent length, then this knowledge
defeats my prima facie experiential justication for the belief that the lines are of a dierent
length. As the theory holds that perceptual experience is propositional, there is no longer a
problem in claiming that additional evidence can e.g., contradict, and thereby defeat, perceptual
experience.
Third, most dogmatists hold that their thesis is necessarily true in virtue of an experience's
phenomenology.7 Although one could, in principle, be a reliabilist dogmatist on the grounds that
it is contingently true that an experience that p is reliably related to the belief that p, I am only
concerned with the former phenomenalist version of dogmatism (Chudno, 2011).
The fact that, according to dogmatism, you merely need to have a perceptual experience that
p to have justication for the belief that p might lead one to conclude that the experience is not
really acting as evidence after all. One might feel condent in this conclusion especially because
Pryor explicitly claims that \it would be misleading to call these experiences your \evidence"
for belief" (Pryor, 2000, p. 519). However, Pryor is here concerned with being misinterpreted
as claiming that one needs to reason from premises about experiences to a conclusion about
the world. Dogmatism is especially meant to resist such a strong demand for justication: the
experience itself is what provides the justication for the belief, not any premises about the
experience.
Moreover, the focus on having an experience that p also arises because, again, the discussion
is directed at propositional justication. Once one starts discussing doxastic justication, it
becomes clear that more is required than just having an experience that p. The subject in
question should also base his belief that p on the experience that p in the right way. For instance,
the belief that p won't be justied, despite a subject's having the experience that p, if the subject
bases the belief on the fact that he likes the sound of p. What the basing requirement further
demands of a subject is not entirely clear. According to Huemer, \when one apprehension, B, is
based on another, A, A causes B because A (apparently) logically supports B" (Huemer, 2001,
p. 56). Huemer claries this proposal with the following example: \I am disposed to infer that
Liz isn't home from the fact that her phone rang eight times with no answer, only because the
latter fact appears to me logically relevant to that conclusion" (ibid). This seems to suggest
that a subject must somehow understand that his experience logically supports a certain belief
to be justied in holding this belief on the basis of the experience. But this demand might be
too strong to account for justied beliefs (and knowledge) of unsophisticated epistemic agents.
7This is true of e.g. Pryor (2000; 2004), Huemer (2001), Tucker (2010), and Chudno (2011).
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However one wants to deal with this issue exactly, it should be clear that dogmatism views
experience as evidentially justifying belief. That is why it is important that experiences have
propositional content: without it, the logical connection that Huemer takes to be important for
evidential justication is not clearly present. But even though propositional content makes sure
that it is possible to logically connect experiences to beliefs, it also brings with it some other
requirements before they can justify those beliefs.
Take the case where my belief that q is justied by my belief that p and my belief that if p,
then q. There is a clear logical connection between the former belief and the latter two in that it
is logically entailed by them. Yet the belief will not be justied if the premise beliefs themselves
are unjustied. This is basically the same point as made in discussing Feldman and Conee's
account of what could constitute evidence, although it is no longer couched in those terms. The
point is simply that a belief cannot evidentially justify another belief if it is itself unjustied. So
there are at least some propositional states that need to be justied before they can evidentially
justify another belief.
There are also propositional states that cannot confer evidential justication at all. Take
desires and imaginations as an example. I might come to believe that p because of my strong
desire that p, but this belief would surely not be justied. Similarly, simply imagining that
p also cannot evidentially justify me in believing that p. Now one explanation of this fact is
that all states need to be justied before they can provide any evidential justication (Lyons,
2009a, 74-5). This would preclude desires and imaginations from evidentially justifying beliefs
not simply because they are not themselves beliefs, but rather because they are not the kind of
states that can be justied. And if this explanation is correct, then the same goes for perceptual
experience.
Even if one does not agree with this explanation, it does provide a challenge for dogmatism
which puts the burden of proof back on its shoulders. Dogmatism needs to explain two things
to provide a ground for their otherwise ad hoc claim that perceptual experience can evidentially
justify belief. First, it needs to explain the dierence between perceptual experience and non-
justifying propositional states like desire and imagination that enables only the former to provide
evidential justication. Second, it needs to explain the dierence between perceptual experience
and belief that enables only the former to provide evidential justication without being itself
in need of justication. Call this the Distinctiveness Problem for dogmatism. Note that it
will not help dogmatism to appeal to the non-propositional nature of experience to answer the
Distinctiveness Problem, as this will only land the theory on the other, equally unsatisfying,
horn of the Sellarsian dilemma.
Several phenomenal properties have been suggested with which one might answer the Distinc-
tiveness Problem. Huemer (2001, pp. 77{79) claims that perceptual experience has the property
of forcefulness: it not only has representational content but also presents this content as actual-
ized. Pryor (2005, p. 357) holds that a perceptual experience has the distinctive phenomenology
of \seeming to ascertain that a given proposition is true." Chudno (2011) presents a theory
according to which perceptual experience (and other seemings, like intuitions) has a presenta-
tional phenomenology: in having a perceptual experience \you both seem to fact-perceive that p
and seem to be sensorily item-aware of an item that makes it the case that p" (Chudno, 2011,
p. 320). I extensively argue elsewhere that it is not clear whether all these proposed properties
are really distinctive of perceptual experience, and that, even if they are, they might well be
reducible to, or caused by, higher-order beliefs (Author, 2013). If the latter suggestion is true,
then this is devastating to the dogmatist's thesis, as it cannot solve the Distinctiveness Problem
by invoking other beliefs for which no account of justication has been provided.
Another problem with the proposed phenomenal properties is that it's not clear why these
are epistemically relevant. If one wants to explain what is distinctive of perceptual experience
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that enables it to provide evidential justication without being itself justied, then an explana-
tion needs to appeal to a distinctive, epistemically relevant property. But why does it matter
epistemically that an experience presents a certain representational content in a specic way?
The dogmatist already accepts the second horn of the Sellarsian dilemma, that experiences have
propositional content, to make sure that they can have familiar evidential relations to the propo-
sitions they supposedly justify. So why then still think that phenomenology can also make an
epistemic dierence? Although this question might be dicult, in the light of the externalist
alternative it would be best if the dogmatist was able to answer it.
4 The Externalist Alternative
Each of the two discussed theories grasps a dierent horn of Lyons' (2008; 2009a) version of the
Sellarsian dilemma without being able to overcome the problems associated with it. The way out
of the dilemma is to reject the idea that perceptual experience provides evidential justication
for belief. I'll briey discuss two recent externalist alternatives that accommodate this idea, and
suggest a way to improve on them.
4.1 Millar's higher-order recognitional account
The rst externalist alternative is presented by Alan Millar (e.g., 2011), according to which the
evidential justication for perceptual beliefs is provided by factive reasons along the following
lines (Higher-Order Perceptual Justication):
HOPJ S's perceptual belief that p is justied by S's knowledge of the fact that S perceives that
p.8
Although Millar agrees with the evidentialist and dogmatist that perceptual justication is
evidential in nature, he has a radically dierent take on what constitutes this evidence. According
to Millar, knowledge is the primitive notion in terms of which the notion of justied belief should
be explained (Millar, 2011, pp. 337-8). The evidence for perceptual beliefs is not constituted by
perceptual experience, but by higher-order knowledge of one's own situation.
For Millar, both rst-order perceptual knowledge and higher-order knowledge of one's own
situation have to do with the exercise of recognitional abilities. In the case of rst-order per-
ceptual knowledge, the relevant abilities are perceptual-recognitional abilities, which are ways of
telling that certain things have certain properties from the way these things appear (Millar, 2011,
p. 334). For instance, I have the ability to visually recognize tomatoes if I am able to tell that
something is a tomato from the way it looks. However, I can only have this ability if tomatoes
present a distinctive appearance, one that is a reliable indication of their being a tomato (Millar,
2011, p. 343). Perceptual-recognitional abilities are thus environment-dependent: if I live in an
environment with lots of ringers for tomatoes, then I could not have a perceptual-recognitional
ability for tomatoes. Moreover, even if I am in a favorable environment, I could still fail to
exercise a perceptual-recognitional ability if I am unknowingly confronted with the only tomato-
ringer in the entire country. According to Millar, exercising a perceptual-recognitional ability is
a success-notion: I have only exercised it if I have actually recognized an object for what it is
(Millar, 2011, p. 342).
8To be precise, according to Millar the fact that I see that p is the reason for believing p, and this reason is
made available to me if I know that I see that p. But I think that HOPJ will suce for our purposes.
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It is important to stress that Millar does not take perceptual knowledge to be based on evi-
dence.9 Although an object must have a distinctive appearance to ground a subject's perceptual-
recognitional ability, this distinctive appearance does not act as evidence for the subject's belief
that the object is, say, a tomato. The subject might not even be able to articulate on the basis
of which precise features he is able to identify an object. So even though Millar agrees with
dogmatists and evidentialists that perceptual justication is evidential in nature, he disagrees in
taking perceptual knowledge to be non-evidential in nature.
In analogy with his theory for rst-order perceptual-recognitional abilities, Millar also pro-
vides a theory for higher-order knowledge of one's own situation (Millar, 2011, p. 344). The
relevant recognitional ability is in this case not a perceptual-recognitional ability, as one does
not recognize that one is e.g., seeing that there are tomatoes in the basket on the basis of the
appearance of the tomatoes and the basket. Still, one has a certain way of telling that one is
seeing that there are tomatoes in the basket, i.e., a recognitional ability towards one's own sit-
uation. The exercise of this higher-order recognitional ability depends on the rst-order ability
in the following way: a subject can only recognize that he is seeing that p if he is in fact seeing
that p. This again reects Millar's idea that exercising a recognitional ability is a success notion.
Nevertheless, it is possible for someone to believe that he is seeing tomatoes in the basket,
without actually seeing them. Given Millar's thesis that having a justied perceptual belief
has to do with having a factive reason for this belief, this means that someone might think
he has a reason for his perceptual belief which he does not in fact have. This could happen
by being unwittingly in an unfavorable environment, or by being in a favorable environment
while unwittingly looking at the only look-a-like in the neighborhood. In both these cases, a
subject fails to exercise his recognitional abilities and thereby lacks perceptual knowledge and
justication.
Millar's approach to knowledge and justication brings with it two related problems.10 First,
on Millar's account, having knowledge does not entail having a justied belief. Millar's theory
does not exclude that there are cases in which we see that, and thereby know that, p, without
recognizing that we see that p. Since rst-order and higher-order knowledge have to do with
dierent recognitional abilities, it surely is possible that someone exercises the former without
exercising the latter. But that means that there are possible cases in which one has a knowl-
edgeable belief without having justication for that belief, which goes against our ideas about
the relation between knowledge and justication.
Second, Millar precludes unsophisticated believers from having any justied beliefs. Since
unsophisticated believers are not able to form any higher-order beliefs, they will never have access
to the factive reason that they are perceiving that p, and will therefore always lack justication
for the perceptual belief that p. So although unsophisticated believers are able to have perceptual
knowledge, they could never have perceptual justication according to Millar's account. These
two problems, while maybe not knock-down objections to the theory, nevertheless provide a good
reason to look for a possible alternative theory of perceptual knowledge and justication.
4.2 Lyons' inferentialist reliabilism
The second externalist alternative I'd like to discuss is Lyons' (2009a) inferentialist reliabilism.
Although Millar rejected the idea that perceptual experience provides evidential justication for
belief, he nonetheless retained the idea that perceptual beliefs are evidentially justied. Lyons,
in contrast, goes one step further and altogether denies that perceptual beliefs are evidentially
justied.
9This is stressed in (Millar, 2010, pp. 121-22).
10These problems were brought to my attention by Christoph Kelp.
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Like dogmatism, Lyons' inferentialist reliabilism takes perceptual beliefs to be epistemically
basic: one need not have justication for other beliefs to have justication for perceptual beliefs.
In fact, inferentialist reliabilism stresses that basic beliefs, which do not depend on evidential
connections to other beliefs for their prima facie justication, should be clearly distinguished
from non-basic beliefs, which do. Each class of beliefs has its own conditions for justication:
reliability of the belief-forming process is sucient for justication of basic beliefs, but the
justication of non-basic beliefs requires at least conditional reliability of the belief-forming
process and justication of the beliefs on which the non-basic beliefs are based (Lyons, 2009a,
pp. 177-8).
The following conditional expresses Lyons ideas about the justication of basic beliefs, the
class of beliefs to which perceptual beliefs belong (Inferentialist Reliabilist Basic Justication):
IRBJ If S's belief that p is the result of the noninferential operation of a primal
system, and the relevant process is reliable, then the belief that p is prima facie
justied (Lyons, 2009a, p. 177).
On this theory, perceptual beliefs are non-evidentially justied by being the output of a
specic sort of reliable process. It is able to overcome the classic problems of clairvoyance
(Bonjour, 1980) and Mr. Truetemp (Lehrer, 1990), in which odd but reliable processes intuitively
do not lead to justied beliefs, by the clause that the processes leading to basic beliefs must be
carried out by a primal system. Such a primal system is a system that (a) is inferentially opaque,
i.e., its output beliefs are formed cognitively spontaneous, and (b) has developed as the result of
the interplay of learning and innate constraints (Lyons, 2009a, p. 136).
Condition (a) appears to be relevant for the denition of justied basic belief in a way that
condition (b) is not. Just suppose that, in contrast with (a), I had access to the fact that some
of my beliefs were used by my perceptual system in producing its outputs. Specically, suppose
that I could introspectively ascertain that Jack's looking angry was caused by my prior belief
that Jack is angry.11 In that case it seems that my belief that Jack looks angry would neither
be epistemically basic, nor justied.
In contrast, condition (b) appears to be more ad hoc.12 Although it excludes clairvoyance
and Truetemp-style cases, there seems to be no general reason to suppose that a system must
have developed as the result of an interplay of learning and innate constraints in order for it to
produce justied, basic beliefs. To make this clear, let's rst look at the original Truetemp case,
and then proceed to a variation on it.
In the original case, Mr. Truetemp has, unbeknownst to him, recently been implanted with a
device which reliably registers the specic temperature and reliably produces beliefs about this
specic temperature (a `tempucomp'). Truetemp accepts these beliefs without reection, and
thus comes to believe such facts as that it is now 104F. Intuitively, Truetemp is not justied in
his beliefs, even though they are the output of a reliable process. This case can thus be used as
support for the claim that reliability by itself is insucient for justication.
Lyons' way out of this problem is that Truetemp's tempucomp does not count as a primal
system (as it did not develop in the right way), thereby making his beliefs about temperature
non-basic. And, according to inferentialist reliabilism, reliability by itself is indeed insucient
for justication of non-basic beliefs. However, suppose that Mr. Truetemptwo not only has a
tempucomp implanted, but that his brain is also rewired in such a way that it is as if he has
had this new sensory modality for quite some time, and as if he had fully adapted to it through
11The example is from Susanna Siegel (2012).
12Note that Lyons himself is not necessarily adverse to dropping this condition (Lyons, 2009a, pp. 164-5).
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learning.13 Truetemptwo's new sense modality is fully integrated with his other senses, and
Truetemptwo trusts in the output of his tempucomp just as he trusts in the output of his other
senses. In fact, the surgery is such a success that Truetemptwo does not even notice any relevant
dierence between his tempucomp and his other senses.
Truetemptwo appears to be justied in his beliefs even though his tempucomp still does not
count as a primal system | something that Lyons has to deny given his full theory of justication
(Lyons, 2009a, pp. 177-8). Truetemptwo did not acquire the system through (a combination
of) learning or innate development, but had it instead implanted into the brain as if he had
learned to sense with it. Although this example might appear articial, the point it makes can
also be developed with other cases. For instance, suppose that an unsophisticated believer, a
creature only capable of rst-order belief, developed a tempucomp-like sense because of exposure
to radiation. It had always been capable of feeling heat, but could now discriminate temperatures
far more precisely. On the basis of this new sense it forms the belief that its favorite food is
located at places with precisely this temperature, and even manages to locate more food on the
basis of this belief. The intuitive pull to judge this creature to be unjustied in its beliefs appears
to be less strong than in the original Truetemp-case. This suggests that the intuitions about
justication in Truetemp-style cases do not have anything to do with the fact that the beliefs are
not the output of primal systems, but rather, that it has something to do with the higher-order
beliefs of the epistemic agents in question.
4.3 Higher-order Defeat
The latter suggestion can be cashed out by taking higher-order beliefs to be capable of defeating
rst-order perceptual beliefs. Although the suggestion that Truetemp-style cases can be dealt
with by appealing to the notion of defeat is hardly new (e.g., Goldman 1986, pp. 111-2; Greco
2003, p. 475) it is interesting to see how this proposal combines the good aspects of both Millar's
and Lyons' account without falling prey to the problems I mentioned. Moreover, what I will be
suggesting about higher-order defeat also diers in some crucial aspects from what others have
proposed.
Millar plausibly claims that we, human believers, normally know that we are perceiving that
p when we are perceiving that p. Similarly, one can also claim that we usually know that we
remember that p when we remember that p. We normally have at least some higher-order knowl-
edge of the source of our beliefs, even if we do not know precisely how they are caused.14 However,
problems for Millar's theory arise once we take this fact to show that perceptual justication,
or basic justication in general, requires that we have higher-order knowledge of the source of
our beliefs. This precludes unsophisticated believers from having perceptual justication, and
has the counter-intuitive result that subjects can have perceptual knowledge while they lack
perceptual justication.
In contrast, these problems do not arise if we take the evidential relation between higher-
order beliefs and perceptual justication to be possible but not necessary. Higher-order beliefs
can serve to strengthen the justication of perceptual beliefs if they are themselves justied in
the way inferentialist reliabilism envisages. More importantly for our purposes, higher-order
beliefs can defeat the prima facie justication of the beliefs they are about, thereby making them
ultima facie unjustied. In the case of Truetemp, the specic belief that it is 104F comes out
13James Beebe (2004) uses this variation on the Truetemp case to show that the original case is actually
underdescribed and therefore leads to the mistaken conclusion that Truetemp is unjustied in his beliefs. I think
this response focuses too much on the contingencies of human belief acquisition to work as a general response
against Truetemp-style cases.
14I agree with Greco (2000, p. 188) that we usually do not have occurrent beliefs about the source of our beliefs,
but we do have some dispositional beliefs about it even if they are not always very specic.
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of the blue, something that should be recognizable even for Truetemp himself. Given that we
normally are aware of the source of our beliefs, recognition of the fact that one does not know
where one's belief comes from seems sucient to distrust or reject this belief altogether. Note
that such an analysis of the case also explains why Truetemptwo is justied in his belief that
it is 104F. Truetemptwo believes that his belief that it is 104F is no dierent from, say, his
belief that the air is very dry: he takes both beliefs to stem from his senses even if he does not
know which one exactly. Truetemptwo therefore lacks the relevant higher-order belief that would
defeat his rst-order belief, and remains justied in his belief that it is 104F.15 This enables
inferentialist reliabilism to deal with Truetemp-style cases without the ad hoc addition of an
etiological constraint on the cognitive systems capable of producing basic beliefs.
The details of the process of defeat could be worked out in dierent ways. One could try to
use Goldman's (1979) analysis of defeat in terms of an alternative reliable process that would
lead to disbelieving p, but then the Truetemp-case could be adapted in a way that would prevent
Truetemp's beliefs from being defeated. For instance, Truetemp might be terrible at introspec-
tion, thereby having no alternative reliable process which would lead to disbelieving that it is
104F.16 The lesson we should draw from this, I suggest, is that higher-order beliefs are capable
of defeating the justication of rst-order beliefs even if the higher-order beliefs are themselves
unjustied. This is not as strange as one might at rst expect: if one accepts that justied
higher-order beliefs can defeat rst-order beliefs, then why think that defeat does not occur in a
situation that is epistemically worse, namely when one's higher-order beliefs are unjustied?
Finally, note that the idea that unjustied beliefs can defeat prima facie justication is fully
compatible with Lyons' own ideas about evidential justication. According to Lyons, non-basic
beliefs derive their justication from whatever justied the beliefs on which they are based (Lyons,
2009a, p. 75). Thus, if the premise beliefs are not justied themselves, then the concluding non-
basic belief also cannot acquire justication. In contrast, in the case of defeat, the defeated
belief loses justication (if anything), so there is no need for the supposition that the defeater
itself is justied. This means that there is nothing in Lyons' view on evidential justication that
prevents him from accepting that unjustied beliefs can be defeaters, even if the details of this
story remain to be worked out.
5 Conclusion
Evidentialism and dogmatism both succumb to a version of the Sellarsian dilemma because of
their commitment to the idea that perceptual experience is evidential in nature. Evidentialism
cannot make sense of the supposed evidential relation between non-propositional experiential
states and beliefs, and dogmatism cannot explain why propositional experiential states need not
be justied themselves before they can confer any evidential justication. There are at least
two externalist alternatives that can accommodate the idea that perceptual experience is non-
evidential in nature, thus allowing a way to block the dilemma. One can either accept that
perceptual beliefs are evidentially justied by higher-order knowledge, or accept that perceptual
beliefs are non-evidentially justied by being the outcome of some sort of reliable process. I
have suggested that a specic combination of these views works best: perceptual beliefs are
non-evidentially justied, but can be evidentially defeated by higher-order beliefs.
15The same is true for the unsophisticated creature that gains an extra sensitive heat-sense due to radiation:
since it lacks higher-order beliefs, it lacks defeaters that could prevent it from being justied.
16Lyons (2009a, p. 124) raises this objection to dealing with Truetemp-style cases in terms of defeat.
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